The double helix of cultural assimilationism and neo-liberalism: citizenship in contemporary governmentality

Willem Schinkel and Friso van Houdt

Abstract
In this article the recent transformations of citizenship in the Netherlands are analysed in relation to a developing form of governmentality. We regard citizenship as a state regulated technique of in- and exclusion and a crucial instrument in the management of populations. Taking the Dutch contexts of immigration and integration as our case, we argue that cultural assimilationism and neo-liberalism appear in a double helix: they combine to form a new governmental strategy we call neo-liberal communitarianism. Neo-liberal communitarianism is the underlying rationale of a population management that operates both in an individualizing (citizenship as individual participation and responsibility) and a de-individualizing way (‘community’ at various aggregate and localized levels as frame of ‘integration’). It thus combines a communitarian care of a Dutch culturally grounded national community – conceived as traditionally ‘enlightened’ and ‘liberal’ – with a neo-liberal emphasis on the individual’s responsibility to achieve membership of that community. ‘Community’ is thereby selectively seen as mobilized and present (when immigrant integration is concerned) or as latently present and still in need of mobilization (when indigenous Dutch are concerned). Concomitantly, a repressive responsibilization and a facilitative responsibilization are aimed at these two governmentally differentiated populations.

Keywords: Governmentality; citizenship; neo-liberal communitarianism; responsibilization; cultural assimilationism

Introduction: formal and moral citizenship

Citizenship has been of renewed interest over the last few decades not only in academia (cf. Kymlicka and Norman 1994; Habermas 1996; Van Gunsteren 1998; Benhabib 2004) but also in government policies ranging from immigration
and naturalization to policies of citizen participation and safety. In this article we aim to show, taking the Netherlands as our case study, that various reconfigurations of national forms of citizenship take shape in the governing of populations. We argue, in line with Sassen (2006: 22), that alongside denationalizing processes, citizenship is subject to various renationalizing efforts. In policy, a renewed interest in ‘active citizenship’ becomes apparent that is strongly coupled to national culture, and to ‘norms and values’ deemed essential to the nation. The context of immigration, the supposed failures of multiculturalism and a renewed interest in national identity form one part of the backdrop of recent changes in the concept of citizenship in the Netherlands, where it has become a central concept in policy and discourse on ‘immigrant integration’.

Another factor explaining the transformations of citizenship is the rise of a neo-liberal emphasis on ‘individual responsibility’. This takes place in the context of welfare state entitlements, but also in the form of a ‘responsibilization’ (Burchell 1993) at the national and local level of safety policies (cf. Garland 2001) that have increasingly come to form a nexus with immigrant integration policies.

This neo-liberal strand fits well with a relatively conservative emphasis on regaining the fundamental values of society (Dean 1999, 2002; Brown 2006). These twin processes, the first a moralization of citizenship in the context of debate and policy on immigrant integration, the second a responsibilization of citizenship in the context of the progressive adoption of neo-liberal forms of governing (Miller and Rose 2008), come together in the recent transformations of the concept of citizenship in the Netherlands. The Netherlands thereby makes an interesting case because in both respects, it can be seen as something of a forerunner. Within continental Europe, it is one of the first extended welfare states to have undertaken the path towards neo-liberal policies. And in the field of immigrant integration, it was one of the first to radically break with a discourse now deemed ‘multiculturalist’ (Schinkel 2010). In fact, it is often cited as an example of a radically harsh policy and public debate vis-à-vis migrants (Buruma 2006; Eyerman 2008; Geschiere 2009; Schinkel 2009a), for instance also in the field of crime control (Downes and Van Swaanningen 2007).

In this article, we regard citizenship as a state regulated mechanism of inclusion and exclusion (Brubaker 1992: 21; Bosniak 2006: 124–5) that is a crucial instrument in the (inter)national management of populations (Hindess 2000). We moreover make use of a distinction between formal citizenship and moral citizenship (Schinkel 2010). This distinction pertains to the relative emphasis on citizenship in the formal sense vis-à-vis more moralized notions of the ‘good’ or ‘active citizen’ (compare: Kymlicka and Norman 1994: 353; Habermas 1996). This distinction resembles what Lockwood (1996: 536) calls ‘citizenship rights’ and ‘moral resources’. Formal citizenship is more than the form of recognition of moral accountability, as in Honneth (1992: 211). It refers to juridical status as membership of a juridico-political order (a nation-state), which entails civic, political, social and cultural rights and duties. Moral citizenship refers to an
extra-juridical normative concept of what the good citizen is and/or should be. Formal citizenship of course always has a moral aspect, and in practice, the two are inseparable. There is for instance a moral aspect to the duty of paying one’s taxes. The value of the analytical distinction between formal and moral citizenship lies in the relative weight allotted at any given time to either the formal or the moral aspects of citizenship. We therefore don’t oppose formal citizenship and moral citizenship as two distinct forms of citizenship, but we see them as two aspects that may be more or less highlighted.

The formal/moral distinction offers a way of interpreting how, specifically from the early 1990s, a balance is sought between the formal and the moral aspects of citizenship, especially in a policy discourse that promotes images of virtuous citizenship that are often not (yet) juridically enforceable. It is there that we most clearly see the coming formations of citizenship in a time characterized by the double helix of cultural assimilationism and neo-liberalism. This amounts to a neo-liberal communitarian governmentality which we shall first clarify. Then, after a brief overview of the history of Dutch integration and naturalization policy and discourse since the 1980s, we subsequently discuss (1) the moralization of naturalization and integration; (2) the moralization of citizenship, which we shall call a ‘virtualization of citizenship’; (3) the emerging nexus of immigrant integration policy and crime control. We then discuss the ways in which a distinction is operative in both policy and discourse between a repressive responsibilization and a facilitative responsibilization. Thus, we show how neo-liberal communitarianism is a way of governing subpopulations through differentiated forms of community and responsibility, which find their expression in newly emerging conceptualizations of citizenship.

**Defining ‘neo-liberal communitarianism’**

‘Neo-liberalism’ is often regarded as an economic ideology or a rationale concerning the relationship between state and market (Harvey 2005; Mudge 2008; compare Mirowski and Plehwe 2009). A perspective linking neo-liberalism to new state and non-state strategies in a broader terrain has been expounded by scholars working in ‘governmentality studies’ (Burchell et al. 1991; Dean 1999, 2007; Rose 1999; Miller and Rose 2008). Taking their clue from Foucault’s thoughts on ‘governmentality’, these scholars argue that neo-liberalism is an extension of liberalism as a mode of governing populations. By governmentality, Foucault denoted various things, among which ‘the ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principal form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security’ (Foucault 1991: 102). Foucault discusses governmentality as born in the eighteenth century with liberalism as its philosophical rationale (Foucault
For Foucault, this was characterized by ‘biopolitics’, as a form of power directed towards the individual as a member of a biological species, i.e., towards population-control (compare Foucault 1976, 2004b).

From a governmentality perspective, (neo)liberalism constitutes a form of governing individuals based on the metaphor of the market, which incites various ‘bourgeois virtues’ (McCloskey 2006) in interacting individuals and eventually leads these individuals to govern themselves. This ‘governing through freedom’ is no more paradoxical than the prevalent liberal idea that autonomy is to be learned (Dean 2007) or that the liberal state is to be approached from the standpoint of ‘ideal theory’ (Rawls 1993). Nikolas Rose has remarked that the liberal governmental insistence on freedom is nowhere as articulated as in neo-liberalism (Rose 1999: 63). The specifically neo-liberal critique of the welfare state, he argues, has led to new rationalizations of government. This critique inaugurated a new welfarism based on a relocation of risk, and an emphasis on the individual responsibility of the citizen. Burchell (1993), O’Malley and Palmer (1996: 144), Rose (1999: 74; compare Miller and Rose 2008: 76ff.) and Garland (2001: 123–7) refer to this as a responsibilization, by which they denote the broader process of making individuals, private sector and community responsible for public tasks.

Another way of conceptualizing such a form of citizenship in neo-liberal discourse itself is by emphasizing ‘active citizenship’ as participation in various societal spheres (Dean 1999: 161). Mitchell Dean has argued, moreover, that there is a significant connection between neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism: ‘neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism share this same diagnosis of the problem of the corruption of the people and the need to lead them to accept their responsibilities and become a virtuous citizenry again’ (Dean 1999: 163). For Dean, such a connection is not a ‘mere hybrid assemblage’, but a crucial characteristic of what he calls contemporary ‘liberal authoritarianism’ (Dean 2002: 57). Dean calls for qualification of that thesis through studies of actual policy developments (Dean 2002: 57). Authoritarianism, he contends, is ‘a permanent pole of liberal rule’ (Dean 2007: 200). But it can assume different forms. In this article, we demonstrate the formation of a neo-liberal communitarian mode of government. Communitarianism, like neo-liberalism, is not simply a political philosophy but a mode of governing (Delanty 2003). We describe two governmental incarnations of a communitarianism that is relatively conservative and emphasizes cultural assimilationism both in a nationalist sense and in a (neo)liberal sense. A selective focus on ‘community’ is the way in which cultural assimilationism takes shape (compare Delanty 2002) in the government of both migrant and indigenous populations. Today a ‘governing through community’ (Rose 1999) combines with a neo-liberal emphasis on the responsibilization of the individual, the ‘cooperation’ between citizens, state and civil society and a newly conceptualized contractual relationship between citizen and state.
This was spurred by, among others, a critique of the welfare state and concerns about immigration and crime. As a consequence, as for instance in the UK (Roche 2002), increasing calls for the formulation of a new social contract and a rearticulation of citizenship have appeared (Dutch Cabinet 2003; Ossewaarde 2007). The ‘active citizen’, according to the Dutch Cabinet in 2003, is a citizen that does not critique the state, but cooperates with it. The Cabinet made clear that ‘integration’ (inburgering; literally: ‘becoming citizen’), in the form of both a ‘Dutch’ and liberal acculturation, especially pertained to youth and immigrants. Such acculturation must therefore become ‘more obligatory’ (Dutch Cabinet 2005: 13). This new contractualism accordingly contains a dual impetus of neo-liberalism and cultural assimilationism. The first appears in the increasing emphasis on ‘individual responsibility’ deemed central to an update of the relation between the citizen and the state (Dutch Cabinet 2003; Ossewaarde 2006; Balkenende 2009).

The second assumes two guises. First of all cultural assimilationism pertains to ‘Dutch norms and values’, which, for instance in measurements of the official Netherlands Institute for Social Research, are seen as ‘modern’, which means ‘secular’, meaning: ‘non-religious’, ‘individualist’, ‘egalitarian’ (Schinkel 2007). It becomes apparent in the mixing of ‘integration’ policies, increasingly attuned to cultural assimilation, and citizenship policies. The second form in which cultural assimilationism appears is intricately connected to this ‘nationalist’ form of assimilationism. It entails the liberal values of freedom and individual responsibility, which are deemed as not inborn. Mostly, however, it is ‘non-western immigrants’ which are deemed lacking in acceptance of such liberal values, and hence the two forms of assimilationism are intricately connected. This is possible for one because contemporary Dutch neonationalism claims ‘Dutchness’ as ‘being enlightened’; thereby paradoxically claiming the Enlightenment as its most valued tradition. In practice, cultural assimilationism in its explicitly nationalist form becomes more readily apparent when migrant populations are addressed in and by policies. In that case, ‘community’ is seen as ‘the Dutch community’ of a nation-state of enlightened individuals. It is then assumed to be an already mobilized community, which is always already present. On the other hand, where the larger indigenous Dutch population is concerned, cultural assimilationism refers to individuals mostly deemed capable of exercising responsibility, and then it comes down to the active mobilization of community, assuming a community that is only latently present but not yet fully actualized. The first form of community, i.e. the nationalized and already mobilized community, is deployed to culturally adjust migrants in order for them to become the liberal subjects that ‘Dutch society’ is composed of. The second form of community, the community that is to be mobilized, is appealed to as a way of inciting those already in possession of liberal subjection to assume responsibility by mobilizing as a community in order to fend off various problems concerning those who are as yet not well
enough ‘integrated’. ‘Community’ is then the answer to the problem of a ‘lack of community’.

Neo-liberal communitarianism is therefore closely connected to a critique of multiculturalism by now pervasive throughout Western Europe (cf. Modood and Werbner 1997; Geschiere 2009). It becomes highly visible also in migration control, for it is in the demands placed upon new citizens that efforts at ‘cultural revitalization’ become most apparent. While neo-liberalism has often been narrowly economically seen as one post-Fordist regime of accumulation (cf. Amin 1994), we therefore aim to illustrate how it simultaneously involves a regime of acculturation. Today, such acculturation takes place both in the form of a governing through community at various aggregate levels of the population and in the form of a governing through responsibility. Neo-liberal communitarianism is therefore one new form of governing in liberal democracy. In the remainder of this article, we illustrate its rise in the Netherlands.

The development of Dutch citizenship since the 1980s: immigration, naturalization and integration

The transformation of Dutch citizenship with respect to naturalization and integration discourse and policies can be summarized as follows: from pluralist to universalist to assimilationist policy-discourse; from thin to thick integration and identification; from state responsibility to individual and market-based responsibility (Joppke 2004; Schinkel 2007; Driouichi 2007; Spijkerboer 2007; Vermeulen 2007; Fermin 2009). In the 1980s a pluralist perspective was dominant in the Netherlands (Schinkel 2007). The demand to discard one’s original nationality in the process of naturalization was seen as needlessly complicating the process of naturalization, and in addition blocking the process of socio-economic integration. At this point, only basic language skills were required for naturalization (Fermin 2009: 19). Minorities were expected to respect the democratic constitutional state (Minorities Paper [Minderhe-dennota] 1983: 11). Equality, emancipation and plurality were the leading principles (Driouichi 2007: 18) and it was assumed that both a strong juridical position in Dutch society and a strong cultural position within minority communities would further socio-economic integration (Schinkel 2007; Vermeulen 2007; Spijkerboer 2007; Fermin 2009). Accordingly, the state assumed responsibility to support minority groups (Driouichi 2007: 20).

The 1994 Outline Integration Ethnic Minorities Policy Paper (Contourennota Integratiebeleid Etnische Minderheden) argued that a new relation between the state and citizens was needed: the state was stepping back and expected more autonomy and responsibility from citizens and local governments (Driouichi 2007: 24–5). Minority policy became integration policy. And while
in the 1980s *emancipation* was the crucial concept, in 1994 *citizenship* became explicitly formulated as the leading principle. This means that (1) citizenship is a reciprocal process involving rights and duties, (2) citizenship is an individual(ized) status (versus the categorical approach prevalent before) and (3) citizenship is mainly the responsibility of ‘allochtons’ (literally meaning ‘not from this soil’; cf. Schinkel 2008; Geschiere 2009) themselves (Spijkerboer 2007: 14–15). This corresponds to the main theme first coined in the *Investing in Integration Policy Paper (Investeren in Integratie)* (1994): the ‘ability to cope for oneself in society’ (Driouichi 2007: 24). These two themes (citizenship and the ability to cope for oneself in society) dominate future policies. Moreover, with the neo-liberal focus on individual responsibility came a decentralization of the organization of civic integration courses to the local level, involving input from civil society organizations.

In the same period the 1998 *Civic Integration Newcomers Act (Wet Inburgering Nieuwkomers)* was formulated. It was noted above that an integration course was present in cases of naturalization. Under the *Civic Integration* policy, newcomers were obliged to follow a civic integration course. These courses focused on learning cognitive skills like language. Next to this, the changes of the nineties also influenced the process of naturalization. In this period double nationalities became a problem once more (in politics but now also in the media) (Fermin 2009). It was argued that not discarding the original nationality meant that migrants were not focused on Dutch society but focused on their own ethnic group and that this would block integration in Dutch society (Fermin 2009). To summarize: in the early nineties both an *individualization* and a *responsibilization* occurred with a main focus on socio-economic participation.

**The rise of neo-liberal communitarianism: the moralization of citizenship**

Next to this, it is possible to speak of a *culturalization* of citizenship in the 1990s. This corresponds to the general attention given to culture in other domains (Jameson 1998; Nash 2001), not least in debates concerning ‘integration’ (Schinkel 2007). Since the 1990s citizenship plays a crucial role in this field (Schinkel 2010). From 2000 onwards policy and discourse in the Netherlands made a decisively assimilationist turn, meaning that both the individualized and responsibilized strategy remained, except that now adaptation to cultural values and norms were prioritized. Since 2000, several things have contributed to the rise of assimilationism. First was a critique of the welfare state which, given the ‘overrepresentation’ of members of minority groups in social security benefits, focused particularly on such groups. Second, there was a more general western European move towards assimilationism, particularly vis-à-vis Muslim minorities (cf. Balibar 1991; Modood and Werbner 1997;
Brubaker 2001; Wieviorka 2005; Grillo 2007; Joppke 2007). And third, popular and scientific concern about the representation of ‘allochtons’ in the ‘wrong’ statistics (on unemployment, crime, school ‘drop outs’), incidents like 9/11, the rise of the populist maverick politician Fortuyn, as well as the murder of filmmaker Theo van Gogh (cf. Buruma 2006; Eyerman 2008) are relevant to understand this change in the Netherlands (Spijkerboer 2007: 17). Yet the mediatized coverage of such issues found fertile ground in an already existing problematization of culture that started with politicians such as Bolkestein (1991). In the period after 2000, it was argued that the problem of integration was closely connected to the ongoing influx of new immigrants (Vermeulen 2007: 48–9). Therefore, the Alien Act 2000 (Vreemdelingenwet) was formulated, making it more difficult to gain asylum in the Netherlands (Vermeulen 2007: 55). The 2002 Integration in Immigration Perspective Policy Paper (Integratie in het Perspectief van Immigratie) emphasized individual responsibility and autonomy alongside Dutch norms and values.

In the context of policies of immigrant integration, this meant a shift in emphasis from formal citizenship to moral citizenship. Dutch discourse on integration has since then increasingly centred on notions of ‘culture’, ‘norms and values’ and proper definitions of ‘Dutchness’ and of ‘Dutch society’ (Schinkel 2007, 2010). At the same time, however, plans to find out what that actually means were implemented, resulting in a ‘Dutch Historical Canon’ (ratified by parliament in 2008) and a ‘Charter Responsible Citizenship’ (2010). Based on ‘shared responsibility between government and citizen’, the latter emphasizes ‘tolerance’, ‘respect’ and ‘participation’ as well as the fact that a ‘clean and safe living environment’ is everyone’s task. This touches first of all on the cultural dimension of citizenship. One of the issues that have surfaced alongside this discussion concerns education. The 1917/1920 Education Act, which enabled equal funding for confessional schools, has come under attack. For one, the confessional school system is under attack because of a specific problematization of Islamic schools (Driessen and Merry 2006). The problematization of confessional schools is then an indirect way of banning Islamic schools. The Dutch Inspectorate of Education provided cause for such problematization in its 2006 report Monitoring citizenship and integration. Hence, among other parties, the Liberal Party (the largest right wing party in the Netherlands) proposed a ban on the establishment of Islamic schools, arguing that the school composition effect of a concentration of children with low-SES scores would hinder integration (Driessen and Merry 2006: 215). And in 2005 the minister of education asked schools to make explicit what they were going to do about ‘citizenship formation’ in their curricula. A Dutch pedagogical scientist commented:

The last two years the government has increasingly intervened in education anyway. (…) The formulation of basic values in order to assess whether Islamic education contributes to social cohesion was an intervention in
education as well. I suggest we go one step further and assess substantively whether a school actually raises children into critically reflecting citizens. (see: Vink 2005).

Here we see a conflation of two forms of assimilationism: the liberal subject is at once the ‘Dutch’ subject. This ‘cultural turn’ in integration has had its most far-reaching consequences in the field of integration and naturalization.

The moralization of naturalization and integration

A cultural and relatively moralizing emphasis has become apparent in integration and naturalization policies (\textit{inburgering}). ‘Norms and values’ were incorporated and given a prominent place in naturalization exams (Van Huis and De Regt 2005; Bjornson 2007; Schinkel 2008). And the process of naturalization and integration was increasingly seen in moral terms. Formerly, becoming a citizen in the formal sense was the crowning achievement of entry into Dutch society. If an immigrant were to gain equal rights, he or she would be in a position to manage him- or herself. In the last decade however, the order has been reversed. Formal citizenship is now regarded as merely the beginning. Real entry into ‘Dutch society’ is possible only through moral citizenship (Schinkel 2008, 2010; compare Spijkerboer 2007; Vermeulen 2007). This is no doubt related to the fact that so-called ‘second generation migrants’ (children of migrants, and therefore in effect migrants who never migrated) are currently often in possession of juridical citizenship but are none the less not deemed sufficiently well ‘integrated’. The reversal of the formal-moral order still renders these persons observable as lacking in ‘citizenship’ when that is seen in cultural and moralizing terms. Citizenship thereby changes from a right to be different (Van Gunsteren 2008) to a duty to be similar, i.e., assimilated.

Concerning naturalization, in 2003 the 1985 \textit{Bill on Dutch Citizenship} was reformulated in more restrictive and culturalized terms: 1) the demand to discard original nationality was reactivated; 2) an extensive naturalization test or civic integration test was implemented (Vermeulen 2007: 55). This test consists of oral and written examination of language skills, knowledge of ‘Dutch society’ and Dutch political organization (IND 2009: 4). Since 2006 naturalization ceremonies are obliged if one is to receive Dutch nationality, for ‘becoming Dutch is a special occasion’ (IND 2009).

The 2004 \textit{Outline Civic Integration Policy Paper (Contourennota)} repeated the responsibility of immigrants themselves to fulfil their duty of civic integration. Immigrants initially have to pay and search for the civic integration courses themselves. It also reiterated a strong focus on norms, values and national identity (Spijkerboer 2007: 41–2) as well as the migrant’s individual responsibility in gaining knowledge of Dutch language and norms and values (Driouichi 2007: 52–3). In 2006, the \textit{Civic Integration Abroad Act (Wet Inburgering Buitenland)} was passed. It stipulated that alien outsiders are to pass a
civic integration course in their own country to get a residence permit for the Netherlands. If a person passes the tests, obligatory civic integration continues in the Netherlands (Driouichi 2007: 82–3). In this new system some (implicit/explicit) selection criterion are at work that are based on (1) economic participation perceived as cultural proximity (and vice versa; hence Japanese, who nearly always work, are counted as ‘western immigrants’) (Vermeulen 2007); (2) a perceived role as child rearers and educators.

First, a distinction is made between Western and non-Western ‘culture’ although this is operationalized in terms of economic success (Spijkerboer 2007: 47). Here the operative image is that of the good citizen as a working (‘participating’) citizen (Spijkerboer 2007: 46). The perceived failure of immigrants to properly participate (economically) is often explained culturally. It is moreover their individual responsibility and failure (Spijkerboer 2007). Therefore, non-western immigrants have to ‘close the cultural gap’. Second, specific emphasis is put on immigrant ‘mothers’ and ‘imams’ in their role respectively as child rearers and educators of youth. It is argued that without basic language skills their ‘lag’ will be passed on to children and therefore they are specifically targeted as in need of (forced) integration (Spijkerboer 2007: 46).

The 2007 Civic Integration Act (Wet Inburgering) established new civic integration courses that now contained aspects of identification and emotional feelings of belonging. And while the previous civic integration course (from 1998) was based on an ‘effort obligation’, meaning that the immigrant had to put some effort in the course but the result was inconsequential, the new civic integration is based on a ‘result obligation’, which means the immigrant has to pass all tests (Schinkel 2010; cf. Vermeulen 2007). The civic integration courses are focused on two groups: ‘new comers’ and ‘old comers’ (oudkomer; the concept is somewhat of a neologism in Dutch as well). A ‘new comer’ is above age 18 and settles for the first time in the Netherlands on a non-temporary basis (these can be alien outsiders or Dutch citizens born on foreign soil) (Driouichi 2007: 53–4). ‘Old comer’ is member of an ethnic minority group, resides legally in the Netherlands for a longer period and is not a ‘new comer’ (Driouichi 2007: 58). Both groups are under this policy obliged to follow and pass a civic integration course within 3.5 years. Failure results in a fine and the inapplicability of a permanent resident status or Dutch nationality (IND 2009). Moreover, after the decentralization of the organization of civic integration courses comes their privatization in 2007, and a market for civic integration now emerges (Spijkerboer 2007; Vermeulen 2007).

Given this overview of recent changes in naturalization and integration policy, two conclusions can be drawn: 1) citizenship is something that increasingly has to be earned through moral conversion – both in the form of ‘Dutch’ cultural assimilation and in the form of a neo-liberal acculturation; 2) more emphasis is placed both on the duties and on the individual responsibilities of immigrants to integrate. The individualizing and responsibilizing strategy of
the 1990s has remained, and instead of a purely socio-economic perspective a culturalized perspective was taken up with a focus on cultural integration both as a goal in itself and as a means to socio-economic integration (Van Houdt, Suvarierol and Schinkel forthcoming). This was mirrored in changes in subsidies for immigrant organizations, which were restricted if they were not for the purpose of connecting different ethnic groups, thus preventing the formation of ‘ethnic communities’ (Uitermark, Rossi and Van Houtum 2005). When ‘community’ is emphasized in recent policy documents, only one ‘ethnic community’ is preferred. This is ‘Dutch society’, characterized by its ‘dominant culture’, which is not recognized as ‘ethnic’, because it is ‘Dutch’, ‘enlightened’ and therefore deemed ‘neutral’ (Schinkel 2007).

**The virtualization of citizenship**

Zooming in on the integration policy discourse, another moralizing element comes in sight. Since 1994 the policy definition of ‘integration’ is: ‘citizenship’. That is a somewhat cryptic definition of a process of integration, but this definition is possible precisely because of the differentiation between formal and moral aspects of citizenship. It first of all entails that the difference between ‘good’ or ‘active’ citizens and ‘inactive’ or ‘risky’ citizens is increasingly articulated along ethnic lines. For many, this entails what we call a ‘virtualization of citizenship’. Many persons subject to scrutiny with respect to their ‘integration’ are in possession of juridical citizenship and are thus citizens in the formal sense. If it then turns out they are lacking in ‘integration’, given the political and policy equalization between ‘integration’ and ‘citizenship’, they are not properly citizens after all. That is to say that their citizenship status is virtualized: instead of being an actuality, a status, it becomes a virtual possibility, a status yet to be attained (see: Schinkel 2010). Moreover, it becomes a virtus, a virtue as it was for the Roman humanists. While this, on the one hand, entails a re-articulation of a republican concept of citizenship, it is, on the other hand, by no means the republican content of citizenship that is adhered to, since it emphasizes ‘active citizenship’ in a dual sense. First of all, ‘active citizenship’ refers to an assimilationism (‘Dutch norms and values’) that perhaps comes closest to certain communitarian notions of citizenship but also contains traces of a conservative conceptualization (cf. Delanty 2003). Second, it entails a (neo)liberal emphasis on ‘individual responsibility’ (Delanty 2002; Habermas 1996). This chimes well with the development of discourse on immigrant integration, which in the 1990s saw the individualization of integration, a concept that in the 1980s still referred to a group-wise emancipation of minority groups. This individualization allows for the one-sided allocation of responsibility for a person’s integration to that person him- or herself. It also codes lack of integration as a lack of will to integrate. And it thereby turns citizenship into a status that is not fully ascribed because it is not fully achieved.

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*British Journal of Sociology* 61(4)
This happens only in case of ‘non-western allochtons’ and it effectuates a discursive ‘ethnicization’ of notions of the ‘active citizen’ that appear in policy documents and political statements. Various policy discourses moreover entail discussions and specific policy programmes on ‘single mothers’, ‘radicalization’, ‘raising one’s children well’ and other issues (Schinkel and Van den Berg forthcoming). These issues are formulated in terms of ‘active citizenship’, but they are selectively problematized in case of ‘non-western allochtons’. Issues such as ‘radicalization’ are restricted to immigrants of ‘Muslim origin’. The effect of this one-sided problematization of ‘citizenship’ is a discursive disenfranchisement of citizens who are citizens in the formal sense but are deemed lacking in the moral sense. In general, the moralization of citizenship in the context of immigrant integration entails both an ethnically selective responsibilization of Dutch citizenship and a (re-)sacralization of ‘Dutch society’ (compare: Brubaker 1992: 138, 143, 182; Van Houdt, Suvarierol and Schinkel forthcoming). Citizenship has accordingly come to be seen in terms of ‘loyalty’ to the ‘Dutch society’ (Schinkel 2007 and 2010; Vermeulen 2007).

The emerging nexus of immigrant integration and crime control

A development concomitant to the neo-liberal communitarian reconfiguration of citizenship in naturalization and integration policy is the rise in salience of issues relating to crime and safety (compare Dean 2002: 53 and 2007: 125). In the context of safety and crime responsibilization remains ethnically and class-selective, but it is at the same time more inclusive in terms of rhetoric and ideology, calling upon all citizens to display ‘active citizenship’ and ‘assume responsibility’ combined with a general argument of restoring the normative attachment of society. It is therefore worthwhile to briefly examine developments in this field, in order to illustrate three points: 1) the broader problematization of moral citizenship in the case of migrants in possession of formal citizenship; 2) the fact that the neo-liberal communitarian reconfiguration of citizenship extends beyond the recalibrating of the formal and moral aspects of national citizenship in the policy field of immigrant integration, and 3) the intertwining of the governing of migrants with crime control.

As of the 1980s crime became defined as an increasingly serious social problem (Van Ruller 1999). The 1985 Society and Crime Policy Paper (SAC: Samenleving en Criminaliteit) drafted by the Ministry of Justice argued for the first time that the government was not able to cope with the crime problem alone (compare Garland 2001) and that it should ‘mobilize individual citizens and civil society, including local governments and the private sector, to fight the mass manifestation of crime’ (SAC 1985: 20). This ‘mobilization of society’ (Donzelot 1991) in effect means a ‘responsibilization’ (Burchell 1993) of non-state actors. In addition, it was argued that ‘normative attachment’ and more ‘functional surveillance’ was needed (SAC 1985: 40). In the 1993 Integral Safety
Report (ISR), safety was seen as the object of citizen responsibilization and accordingly became decentralized in terms of government responsibility. National and local government responsibility to ensure the safety of citizens to an increasing extent came to mean: the responsibility to responsibilize citizens and the responsibility to moralize citizens, more specifically youths and immigrants. A ‘segmentized’ focus is therefore present in an orientation towards certain parts of the population deemed irresponsible or lacking responsibility. This often entails a ‘spatialized’ focus (compare Hayward 2004): the actors in the ‘safety chain’ (e.g., justice department, police, local municipality, housing corporations and citizens) are to work together at the local level of the neighbourhood, especially where large numbers of ‘non-western migrants’ are ‘concentrated’. Such inhabitants lower the level of safety in ‘objective measurement drives’ such as the Rotterdam Safety Index (Noordegraaf 2008). The ‘integral approach’ thus chosen crosses the public/private divide in two ways: public and private institutions work together to further ‘prevention’ in policies designed to go ‘behind the front door’ (Van den Berg 2008).

Both youth and family and immigrant integration became the focus of attention in crime and safety policy in the 1990s. A special committee (committee Van Montfrans 1994) advised on how to deal with immigrant juvenile delinquency, and scientific attention was given to this issue (cf. Junger-Tas 1996). Increasingly since then, a minority of the population – which indeed often consists of ‘minority populations’ – is highly actively approached by the government, using a bellicose rhetoric of ‘front line’, ‘city marines’ (high officials with extreme levels of discretion, i.e., a ‘strike force’) and ‘intervention teams’ in an attempt to responsibilize certain groups (roughly this amounts to low income members of ethnic minority groups living in the relatively most dilapidated parts of the city). This is a highly repressive responsibilization, over against the facilitative responsibilization of those already deemed able to assume responsibility. It involves both forms of community policing and community mobilization, and notions of exception and zero tolerance as well as the ‘broken windows’ theory of crime (Van Ostaaijen and Tops 2007: 24) typical of neo-liberal strategies of dealing with safety (Brenner and Theodore 2002; Wacquant 2008; compare Ong 2006). ‘Integration’ as cultural assimilation and ‘crime control’ have thus become gradually overlapping policy fields, forming a nexus in which crime control has in practice become a prominent form of governing ‘migrants’ through selective and differentiated appeals to both ‘responsibility’ and ‘community’.

The Janus-face of responsibilization

Responsibilization is thus a Janus-faced strategy, but in both cases it resonates a moral discourse on ‘society’s norms and values’. Repressive responsibilization
involves the moral education of citizens deemed unable to assume responsibility. In general, special attention is given to Moroccan and Antillean youth (Van den Berg 2009). More specific, special boot camps (Den Engh, Glenn Mills) were established to discipline, educate and normalize troublesome youth. In addition to this, special programmes were developed for the education of (Moroccan and Antillean) single mothers (Van den Berg 2009). Next to this, ‘early intervention’ is made possible in ‘troublesome’ families not behaving according to ‘Dutch norms and values’ (cf. Rotterdam City Council 2009). These families are actively followed, guided and educated on how to take responsibility for their household. In sum, this involves the moral education of citizens deemed unable to assume responsibility and classified as a ‘risk’ and (potential) threat to social order. It is repeatedly argued that safety is primarily the responsibility of citizens themselves, who should actively participate in making their living environment a safe haven while government assists by facilitating financially and otherwise. Although couched in a universalizing rhetoric, it is clear that crime and safety policy are specifically geared at the management of ethnically selective poor populations (Noordegraaf 2008; Schinkel and Van den Berg forthcoming), where the state displays significantly more repressive control than mere financial facilitation (Schinkel 2009b). The latter amounts to a facilitative responsibilization, which is geared at the population at large and meant to mobilize an attachment to norms and values concerning individual responsibility that are deemed already present, if often, in today’s ‘individualized society’, latently so. These two forms of responsibilization thus correspond to the double usage of ‘community’. The repressive responsibilization of migrants presupposes the Dutch cultural community of ‘society’ in which migrants are to be integrated, i.e., to become liberal subjects. The facilitative responsibilization presupposes that same community to be merely latently present yet mobilizable on the basis of an existing liberal subjechthood.

This convergence of responsibilization and moralization, couched in terms of governance and cooperation and the need to moralize citizens, backed by a strong state, is typical of neo-liberal communitarian governmentality. Crime is regarded both as the product of a lack of responsibility and of a lack of cultural adjustment and community – it thus has reference to a population characterized by what Lockwood calls ‘civic deficit’ (Lockwood 1996: 536; compare Dean 2007: 125). ‘Community’ is actively promoted as a way of both preventing and combating crime. It is therefore both used in a nationalist cultural sense – when migrant’s lack of adjustment and ‘socio-cultural integration’ is seen as the cause of crime – and in a more neo-liberal sense, when it is said to be composed of active individuals that assume responsibility for the guarding of the norms of civil society (Dean 2002). In effect, this means that a division is produced between migrant youth in specific urban areas, which are deemed lacking in cultural adjustment and responsibility, and much of the rest of the population, which is called upon to express its cultural adjustment by the
enactment of responsibility through preventive forms of community formation. This division into two populations can be seen as a product of an emerging nexus of immigrant integration and crime control. This nexus is characterized by differentiated forms of responsibilization and moralization for both subpopulations governed thereby. It is crucial that both immigrants and non-immigrants are responsibilized and moralized, albeit in juxtaposed ways: the first are to be repressively responsibilized and culturally and morally adjusted; the second are facilitatively responsibilized and called upon to enact their already existing powers of responsibility, cultural integration and moral adjustment. Likewise, cultural assimilation can be interpreted in a double sense, both as national integration and as the becoming of a liberal subject – which for some means a cultural conversion, while for many it means the ‘coming out’ of what they already are.

**Conclusion: the double helix of cultural assimilationism and neo-liberalism**

The double helix of cultural assimilationism and neo-liberalism as we have described it for the Netherlands, consists of a coming together of a communitarian emphasis on ‘Dutch culture’ and ‘Dutch norms and values’ with a neo-liberal emphasis on individual responsibility and participation. Similar convergences have been signalled before, but it has sometimes been ill understood, for instance when Thatcherism, because of its conservatism, is deemed ‘not purely neo-liberal’ (Clarke 2004: 41). Wendy Brown has argued for the US case that neo-liberalism and neo-conservatism go together in a kind of symbiosis (Brown 2006). She sees neo-liberalism, in line with Foucault, as a political rationality (Brown 2006: 693). In this rationality, citizenship is reduced to ‘self-care’ and this conception, she argues, undermines ‘an already weak investment in an active citizenry’ (Brown 2006: 695). Brown thereby appears to adopt a republican concept but foregoes the fact that neo-liberalist rhetorics of citizenship perfectly mimic the republican stress on ‘active citizenship’. She sees neo-liberalism as in fact destroying what neo-conservatives stand for, and the symbiosis of the two is then indeed highly paradoxical. But if her perspective is pushed further along the lines of what Foucault termed ‘governmentality’, neo-liberalism and cultural assimilationism appear in a double helix and never need explicitly reaffirm each other but that, combined, make for a strategy of government that restructures citizenship.

This strategy is a neo-liberal communitarianism, which governs the population of a ‘society’ on the basis of a regime of acculturation by differentiating along cultural lines. These lines determine the dual use of repressive and facilitative responsibilization. And they allow ‘community’ to be both equal to ‘Dutch society’ and to various local preventive communities. This differential mode of governing through responsibility and community has given rise to a
nexus of immigrant integration and crime control. We believe it is crucial for a governmentality perspective to retain focus on such differential and ethnically selective modes of governing. Such selectivity is expressed in the transformations of citizenship. Citizenship offers a thoroughly individualized way of governing subjects, as formal citizenship is tied to the individual subject. But at the same time it allows for an either repressive or facilitative allocation of responsibility at the level of the individual and is thus able to moralize the subject in a more de-individualizing way. Neo-liberal communitarianism thus finds in the responsibility of the individual the panacea for ‘community’ (itself both disease, or rather: patient, as well as cure) and the supposed ‘restoration’ of social order that is necessary for a smoothly functioning economy. Neo-liberal communitarianism is the guiding ideology of a population management that operates both in an individualizing (citizenship as individual participation and responsibility) and a de-individualizing way (‘community’ at various aggregate and localized levels as frame of ‘integration’). Neo-liberal communitarianism combines a communitarian care of a Dutch culturally grounded national community with a neo-liberal emphasis on the individual’s responsibility to achieve membership of that community. This emerging formation of citizenship shapes the relation between government and individual in a contractual rhetoric, giving rise to a transformation of civil society into the site of various ‘public-private partnerships’.

Neo-liberal communitarianism amounts to a strategy of government that can be found in various other countries as well. For instance in the UK, connections between individual responsibility, community and crime-control have emerged under the Blair administration (cf. Hughes 2002; Atkinson and Helms 2007). In addition to this, and in line with our general argument that the neo-liberal communitarian reconfiguration of citizenship extends beyond the domain of immigrant integration, Roche illustrates how New Labour’s ‘new social contractualism’ transformed citizenship in the domains of youth and family and employment in the UK (Roche 2002). Similarly, Rose (1999), Downes and Morgan (2002) and Delanty (2003) have shown how this transformation combines communitarianist elements with neo-liberal elements.

The double helix of cultural assimilationism and neo-liberalism is able to incite political enthusiasm across the political board: from socialists to Christian democrats to right-wing conservatives. It may be one explanation for recent electoral losses of traditional socialists. Having taken up a communitarianism better grounded in Christian democrats and conservatives and a neo-liberalism better rooted in conservative libertarians, socialists appear to be losing ground. Neo-liberal communitarianism has thus been strongly pushed by (centre) left-wing governments throughout western Europe – as was neo-liberalism in general (Harvey 2005; Mudge 2008), but by now it no longer needs its left-wing support. It may thus well be that we will witness both an expansion of a strong state model and its responsibilization tactics, and an
increasingly hypochondriac fixation on the nation as the master-community and model of ‘norms and values’. Such ‘norms and values’ both define the path of cultural conversion for migrants, and lay out the ‘liberal’ and ‘enlightened’ tradition that defines the national community.

(Date accepted: August 2010)

Note

1. Thanks to four anonymous referees and to Hanna Beck and Marguerite van den Berg for helpful comments.

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